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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE WELFARE STATE
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
I. THE GREAT DIVIDE OF 1937
To what extent can our conception of religious liberty survive or
even flourish after the advent of the welfare state? This question,
which I hope to address here, is in some sense inescapable. The
fully developed welfare state is characterized by a high level of
government action in all phases of economic and social life. Neces-
sarily, therefore, some fraction of its constant stream of legislation
will pose a challenge, if not a threat, to the autonomy of religious
institutions. This stream of legislative action poses special analyti-
cal difficulties, moreover, because of the constitutional dualism be-
tween preferred freedoms and economic liberties that is the major
legacy of the Supreme Court's New Deal decisions.
In this context, I shall examine two aspects of that dualism that
are especially relevant to the status of religious freedom: economic
liberties and, more briefly, public finance. By conventional wisdom,
economic liberties include the right to own and dispose of all forms
of property, and to control the disposition of one's labor in the
marketplace.' Under earlier constitutional regimes, these liberties
received a fairly high measure of protection. As a first approxima-
tion, the central role of the government was to insure that property
was protected against encroachment by trespass or other common
law wrongs, and to guarantee that contracts were enforced by the
terms on which they were made. Some important exceptions to the
general rule were well recognized before the 1937 watershed. The
restrictions that the antitrust laws imposed on the freedom of con-
tract were sustained against all constitutional challenge, as they
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
A.B., Columbia, 1964; B.A., Oxford University, 1966; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1968. An ear-
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should be today.' Less justifiably, various restrictions on land use,
from zoning to rent control laws, were also accepted, at least on a
qualified basis under the earlier conceptions of the police power.'
Even if the pre-1937 economic liberties cases did not represent
some idealized version of either heaven or hell, two distinct limita-
tions on government power did have substantial bite before they
were overrun in the New Deal revolution-limitations with impor-
tant implications for the place of religious liberty in the United
States. First, powerful restrictions were placed on the scope of
Congress' commerce power prior to 1937. Commerce meant trade,
not agriculture or manufacture, and certainly not every productive
activity engaged in by mankind.4 Some activities were within the
scope of the commerce power, but other activities fell unremark-
ably outside of it as well. Before 1937, regulation of local employ-
ment practices was the province of the states, save the regulation
of those entities-railroads, for example-engaged in interstate
commerce.5 Lochner v. New York6 was Lochner v. New York, not
Lochner v. United States.
Second, neither Congress nor the state could regulate certain
substantive areas. For example, pre-1937 constitutional law had
developed a rough and ready distinction in employment cases be-
tween "labor" and "health" statutes. The court uniformly held
health (including safety) legislation acceptable against employer
challenges, even when the legislation functioned explicitly in dero-
gation of freedom of contract.7 Train coupling statutes, mine regu-
lations, and workers' compensation all fell on the health side of the
line.8 The Court needed only a modest health or safety justification
2. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). For my views, see
Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1436 n.156 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926); Block v. Hirsh, 256
U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
4. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1895).
5. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294-97 (1936).
6. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7. See, e.g., Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 53 (1912); Southern Ry. Co. v.
United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1911).
8. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (workers' compensation); Plymouth
Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914) (mine safety).
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to sustain a statute that regulated certain kinds of dangerous em-
ployment conditions.'
In contrast, "labor" statutes were beyond the pale of either Con-
gress or the states to enact. This labor category included two types
of regulation critical to understanding the role of religion in the
welfare state: collective bargaining statutes and antidiscrimination
laws. Collective bargaining statutes were not a justified infringe-
ment of the freedom of contract, be they in aid of the employer
who demanded a "yellow dog" contract, or in aid of the employee
who wanted to stay out of the union orbit.10 Likewise, if any anti-
discrimination laws could have been passed, they would have
fallen, I suspect, to the same challenges that doomed the forbidden
labor statutes.
Before 1937, the law was something of a hodgepodge because the
distinctions it drew did not conform to any consistent theory of the
relationship between private ordering and government power."
Yet even though every doctrinal nuance was not philosophically
coherent, one conclusion was sharply etched in the judicial con-
sciousness: In some matters pertaining to the employment context,
the exercise of government power was regarded as an impermissi-
ble infringement on economic liberties. The New Deal revolution
relegated that theory to history. After 1937, Congress had plenary
power in the economic sphere, including labor markets, as individ-
ual rights to resist such regulation had eroded. Viewed from a dis-
tance, the common law rules of freedom of contract in employment
were overrun in two distinct stages. Health risks, which a party
could assume at common law, were taken out of the realm of pri-
vate contract in the first two decades of the twentieth century.
Price, wage and bargaining terms followed with far greater fanfare
twenty years later.
Redistribution and public financing yield a similar picture on
the question of the government's powers to collect and spend tax
revenues. Again, one should not suppose that all forms of redistri-
9. The necessary safety justifications were often too modest. See Powell v. Pennsylvania,
127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888) (sustaining Pennsylvania statute prohibiting manufacture and sale
of margarine to promote the public health and welfare).
10. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,
174-75 (1908).
11. See, e.g., Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11:2 GEo. MASON U.L. REV. 5 (1988).
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bution of wealth were out of bounds before the 1937 revolution. On
this issue too, one finds something of the same clouded picture
that one found with economic liberties. In fact, progressive taxa-
tion was explicitly endorsed before 1937, and cases before 1900
routinely approved use of public funds to provide welfare for the
poor and needy. 2 Nonetheless, all forms of redistribution were not
viewed with equal favor. The law of special assessments limited the
occasions on which one group of individuals could tax another
group for the cost of certain local, but public improvements from
which the first group derived the lion's share of the gain. 3 In these
cases the Court insisted, usually under the due process clause, that
such legislation provide some measure of benefit for the persons
taxed. Although the calculation of benefit was far from an exact
science, prior to 1937 the Court did not adopt an "anything goes"
posture to the overall problem of local abuse. By 1937, however,
the benefit requirement had eroded until it became clear that the
receipt of government protection became a benefit sufficient to jus-
tify virtually any redistributive tax.14 The partial restraints against
redistribution previously in place were wholly removed.
I have criticized these 1937 developments elsewhere, and do not
want to refight that battle here. 5 Instead, I hope to assess the im-
pact that the 1937 revolution has had on the next generation of
cases involving the intersection of religious liberty and government
power. My theme is a simple one. The 1937 revolution did not, and
could not, completely resolve the question of how to reconcile state
power with individual rights for either economic liberties or public
finance. Some relatively small but theoretically important areas of
tension remain.
Today, the constitutional battleground between state power and
the common law conceptions of property and liberty has shifted to
new arenas. Ironically, however, the modern dialogue over church
12. See, e.g., Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890); W. BLUM & H.
KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953).
13. See generally Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Special
Assessments in Nineteenth Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1983).
14. See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 522 (1937).
15. For example, see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985) for the long version, and Epstein, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds
of Error, 4 CATO J. 711 (1985) for a shorter discussion.
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and state takes the same substantive form as the earlier debate
over state and market. While the turf has changed, the vocabulary
used and the principles applied remain unchanged. And the stakes,
although smaller, are still substantial for issues of religious liberty
always strike a sensitive nerve. The principles of liberty and prop-
erty that animated the resistance to an unlimited state police
power before 1937 have found voice in a new arena after 1937. The
concerns with redistribution through taxation have also found ex-
pression in the religion cases-for even if most forms of redistribu-
tion are tolerated, redistribution from, and especially to, religious
organizations has come under increased judicial scrutiny. Yet the
pattern of deference found in economic affairs does not carry over
to religious affairs, however murky the boundary between the two
domains. Once scrutiny becomes stricter, the protection of liberty
and the control of redistribution necessarily become central parts
of the constitutional enterprise.
The subject of this paper is, then, the fate of religious liberty, a
delicate matter in a world in which comprehensive economic regu-
lation is the constitutional norm. I address only a few instructive
illustrations here, but the points, I think, can be easily generalized
to other cases. Primarily, I concentrate my energies on employ-
ment questions, placing to one side a wide number of areas that
also cry out for further analysis-education being perhaps the
most notable of these.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In part II, I
discuss the switch from unanimous consent to majority rule, so
typical of collective bargaining statutes in the employment area, as
being inconsistent with any tenable notion of religious freedom.
Part III examines the scope of religious freedom and concludes
that no external or objective test demarcates the domain of reli-
gious freedom from the more mundane world of secular affairs.
Part IV then shows that justification for religious liberty depends
upon the same subjective theories of value that were once used to
defend economic liberties more generally. Next, Part V addresses
the tension between a broad conception of religious liberty and an
equally broad conception of the establishment clause, and shows
how this tension is exacerbated by the welfare state. Part VI then
explores the judicial response to the tension between collective
bargaining and religious liberty as revealed in the important, if in-
1990]
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conclusive, case of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago.6 Part VII
then investigates the relationship between religious liberty and the
antidiscrimination statutes. Part VIII then examines state efforts
to afford additional protection in the workplace to employees with
distinctive religious beliefs. A brief conclusion follows in Part IX.
II. FROM UNANIMOUS CONSENT TO MAJORITY RULE
The 1937 revolution legitimated the institution of collective bar-
gaining in the constitutional context. That scheme of labor rela-
tions has two basic features, both of which are troubling to persons
who believe in freedom of contract."7 First, labor negotiations do
not require the unanimous consent normally demanded in other
complex free market transactions. Collective bargaining replaces
unanimous consent with the majority rule of workers within a bar-
gaining unit. By administrative order, the state first chooses the
contours of the unit, whose members then decide whether to have
union representation. The minority is bound by the choice of the
majority; it cannot make direct contracts with the employer, but
must be satisfied with the duty of fair representation imposed
upon the union that represents it. The employer, for its part, is
under a duty to bargain with the union representative. The duty is
said to be one of "good faith," with that phrase conveying the clear
message that the duty to bargain is not just another name for the
duty to agree.' 8 When all is said and done, however, there are some
limits to the amount of employer intransigence allowed; in the end,
the ordinary option of just saying "no" and walking away is not
available to the unionized firm.
The system of state limitations on contract necessarily carries
with it state-imposed limitations on property. The hallmark of
property at common law was the right to exclude others from the
use or possession of a thing subject to one's ownership. In essence,
the common law set its face against collective use of private prop-
16. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). I have given a more extensive criticism of these statutes
in Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legisla-
tion, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983).
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). The vagueness of the good faith phrase is not just a drafting
problem. Any other term will have the same difficulties when at-will contracts are
abandoned.
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erty by government fiat. Joint ownership was created only by
unanimous consent. But the advent of the labor statutes meant the
end of exclusivity in the domain of property as well.19 What sense
does it make for the law to say that an employer must bargain with
workers in good faith, but then to permit the employer to retain
the absolute right to exclude them from the workplace? Relin-
quishment of the autonomy over contract, then, necessarily means
relinquishment of absolute control of possession as well. The laws
of trespass cannot be used to keep union representatives off the
employer's premises during any organization campaign or election.
Once a duty to bargain is established, the employer cannot in good
faith insist upon a contract that allows him to keep workers out of
the workplace altogether. The labor statutes go far beyond the
common law rules that relax the owner's claims of exclusive pos-
session only in case of extreme necessity (and without any substan-
tial redistributive consequences).20
What happens when collective bargaining is carried over into the
area of religious institutions? Initially, one should recognize that
imposing a collective governance solution over aspects of religious
life is manifestly impermissible. Suppose, for example, that Con-
gress passed a law that said all religious persons within a given
territorial region were to be governed by a single religious board,
the officers of which were chosen by majority vote of all religious
persons in the affected area. The trustees would of course have fi-
duciary duties toward any minority, and on special application
some groups could demand smaller, separate religious units, in
much the way that craft unions may seek to organize separately
from larger plant unions. Yet that Catholics, Jews and Protestants
could be required to work together under such government aegis is
inconceivable. Indeed, that different denominations of Jews or
Protestants should be required to iron out their differences with
their co-religionists is also inconceivable. Freedom of association is
implicit in the very idea of the free exercise of religion; it will be
vindicated only if unanimous consent is obtained for membership
19. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 493 (1978); Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
20. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 459-60, 124 N.W. 221, 221-
22 (1910).
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in a religious organization. Freedom of association involves the
right to exclude others without having to justify that decision to
anyone.
The intellectual difficulties increase only when religious organi-
zations engage in transactions with their members or, indeed, with
the rest of the world. Religious principles and interests reach at
least some of these questions, for although doctrine and dogma are
essential to religion, they do not define or limit its scope. If free-
dom of contract is not a constitutional norm generally, then how
does it apply to contracts that religious institutions have, both in
their religious matters, such as dues and official appointments, and
in their inevitable contacts with the rest of the world, including
contracts of employment? The dominant question is how to parcel
out the turf of the religious institution between two radically dis-
jointed constitutional regimes, one that looks with favor on any
government regulation of employment and labor matters, and one
that respects the autonomy of religious organizations. The conflict
is inescapable so long as religious liberty stands on firmer footing
than ordinary economic liberties.
III. THE SCOPE OF RELIGION
One possible way to minimize these boundary problems is to give
a narrow conception to what falls within the sphere of religious
activities. One rendering of the sphere limits it to the choice of
doctrine and religious practices. But that view is utterly inconsis-
tent with the views that religious people take of their own affairs.
For them, religion involves a far broader code of conduct. The re-
sult is one of those jurisdictional puzzles that has plagued the rela-
tions between church and state throughout English history, long
before anyone thought of a constitution: Who decides the bound-
ary?2 If the religious institutions determine the scope of their own
practices, very little of consequence will fall outside the religious
ambit. But if the state decides the scope of the religious freedom,
and hence religious immunity from state regulation, pressures are
put in place to make the scope of religious freedom a good deal
21. Indeed, the Assize Utrum, which asks whether certain matters belong to the clergy or
the secular courts, raises this point in very powerful fashion. For discussion, see F.W.
MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 32-40 (1962).
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narrower. In a formal and important sense, the Constitution gives
the supreme power to the secular branch; but what it giveth, it can
also taketh away, for the Constitution itself contains explicit re-
spect for religious freedom that the state is bound to acknowledge.
The Court has taken the general view that "sincere" religious
beliefs are protected from state cross-examination of their sound-
ness.22 Whether this principle is motivated by a respect for reli-
gion, or by a commendable sense of self-preservation, is hard to
decide, but the point hardly matters: Each reason is sufficient and
both together are overpowering. With this one proposition, the
Court has kept itself at a distance from a set of religious controver-
sies that neither it nor anyone else can resolve authoritatively for
believers and nonbelievers alike.
Yet how far does this deference extend? Let us put aside the
question of abuse, which might arise with ad hoc religions that
have as their major doctrinal message exemption from taxation
and military service. 23 Nonetheless, a common tenet of established
religions is that their codes of conduct govern church members en-
gaged in ordinary worldly transactions. Religion conceived by its
practitioners may form a total and complete code of human con-
duct that covers ordinary contracts of sale and employment along
with religious rituals.
If the imperialist impulse of religious practice places great pres-
sure on any preordained boundary line between state and religion,
then the welfare state only exacerbates this conflict. In an earlier
age when liberty and contract were both protected, conflicts be-
tween the religious and the secular could arise if state rules for-
bade what religious principles commanded, or commanded what
religious rules forbade. The most obvious illustration might be a
hypothetical religious rule that required the sacrifice of a human
being in order to propitiate the gods. A more chilling and realistic
example is the recent, and effective, death threat by the late
Ayatollah against Salman Rushdie for the latter's purported defile-
22. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).
23. See the discussion of the point raised in Freed & Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public
Policy: Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 20-30, which I think
overstates the difficulty, especially for the established religions whose practices and beliefs
long antedate the New Deal Revolution.
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ment of the Islamic faith in his The Satanic Verses. 4 In principle,
the enforcement of the ordinary criminal law against murder would
necessarily require the violation of the free exercise of a religious
belief in both scenarios. But the ultimate question is whether the
state's prohibition violates the "free exercise of religion" as found
in the Constitution.
So it is back to first principles. Freedom in this context is a term
that limits as well as empowers. In the religious context, "freedom"
does not confer absolute license any more than it does in ordinary
business or political disputes. Paradoxically, protection of religious
freedom is possible only if courts are wholly indifferent to the in-
ternal beliefs of all the religions they protect. Conviction in the
rightness of beliefs is critical for those who join one faith or an-
other. However, such conviction is wholly irrelevant in any politi-
cal order whose first task is to see how people of fundamentally
different beliefs can coexist.
Within this framework then, freedom is not total license to do
what one wants, wholly without regard for the consequences that
one's conduct has upon others. Rather, freedom is the ability to do
what one wants within a perimeter of rights, such as property and
liberty, without having to justify the choices so made to any other
individual. But the perimeter of rights is one that must apply
across the board. The theory must allow for the compatibility of
"like" individual freedoms for all individuals simultaneously, and
generally seek that set of mutually consistent rights that maximize,
at a best guess, some conception of overall welfare, utility or happi-
ness for the relevant persons. There are enormous complications in
deciding how to move from a set of social concerns to a set of indi-
vidual rights, which I bypass in this context, for all theories agree
that a prohibition against force and fraud is consistent with the
liberty of the same individuals whose conduct is thereby re-
strained. Sacrifice of strangers is clearly an application of the for-
mer, and we should have to prohibit it if only to ensure the free-
dom of other individuals to have any religious beliefs or practices
of their own.
The use of freedom in religious contexts is no different, I believe,
from the use of freedom with respect to speech. There, fraud and
24. S. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES (1989).
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defamation may be controlled, for while they are undoubtedly
forms of speech, they exceed the boundaries of liberty, given the
correlative duties that all speakers have to other persons. More-
over, speech encompasses the same conception of freedom, with its
normal baggage of correlative duties, that derives from the concep-
tions of liberty and property that are today rejected in the eco-
nomic sphere; slander of title is after all a matter of both speech
and property. But with the control of force and fraud foremost in
mind, there is a way for the state to limit religious actions that
does not require an examination of religious principles as such.
Rather, the solution undertakes an alternative strategy of import-
ing into religious disputes the basic principles that have been de-
veloped elsewhere, with other ends in mind. The virtue in this car-
ryover is that it helps assure us that these traditional conceptions
of liberty and freedom are applied to religion without any evident
bias for or against religious associations and practices.
The conclusions here are not always to the liking of religious
people whose own codes can be as authoritarian as those contrived
by secular parties. Thus, in my view, state prohibition of polygamy
on religious grounds is as incorrect as state toleration of sacrifice.2 5
Polygamy takes place only with the consent of the men and women
involved in the marriage, and as such can be regulated by the ordi-
nary office of contract if so desired. The customary marriage vows
in most religions speak about "forsaking all others," and that vow
should be interpreted both in the religious and civil law to bar po-
lygamy by men and women who take such oaths. But the Mormon
oaths were different, and the question is whether offense against
the practices and moral sentiments of the multitude can justify the
suppression of the religious practices of the few. Judicial decisions
that "invent" state interests opposed to polygamy reflect the same
authoritarian tradition that holds that the dominant political
forces know better what is right for others than others know for
themselves. The insistence that these contracts are so repugnant to
ordinary sensibilities and could only have been the result of social
coercion or duress is wholly incompatible with the idea of freedom;
exceptions to the binding power of consent must be proved, and
proved clearly. The exception cannot be presumed merely because
25. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
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polygamists do not do as we would do. Our baseline throughout is
that religious liberty ends only where force and fraud begin, not
before. That line is not even approached, let alone crossed, in the
polygamy cases.
IV. SUBJECTIVE PREFERENCES AND RELIGIOUS SINCERITY
In constitutional discourse, the demarcation between state and
church in practice relies upon the same conceptions of property
and liberty that once set the line between state and market. The
parallel is even closer than might be expected because the line be-
tween church and state rests again upon the same subjective con-
ception of value that once constitutionally justified the separation
of state from market. Skepticism as to the eternal ends of man
rarely motivates religious beliefs. Yet the protection of religious
beliefs in an open society rests not on showing the truth of those
beliefs, but on the inability of anyone to show which set of beliefs
are true or false. Indeed, any effort to ground religious liberty on
religious truth means that only one religious creed (the true one, of
course) may be protected whereas other inconsistent beliefs forfeit
all legal protection. The search for truth thus leads to endless dis-
putations and, worse still, holds out the distinct possibility that no
religious activity is protected because none can show why its truths
are more eternal than its rivals. All inconsistent religious beliefs
can be false even if they cannot be true.
In theory, then, religious liberty can rest only on a religious
foundation only in a theocracy. But matters must be different in a
democracy with even modest pretensions to pluralism. While mem-
bership in religious organizations is rightly conditioned on the ac-
ceptance of a complex set of doctrinal beliefs, membership in a po-
litical society is open to anyone who is willing to respect the liberty
and property of other persons. Churches can excommunicate
nonbelievers, but political organizations cannot exile their nonbe-
lievers. Hence the paradox: The political institutions needed to
guarantee the protection of religious liberty for all cannot take
sides in the disputes that separate various religious peoples. Politi-
cal institutions must adopt a skeptical-dare one say it, agnos-
tic-stance toward any purported religious truths lest false reli-
gious beliefs be denied state protection. Hence the rule that
[Vol. 31:375
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sincerity is all that is needed to protect religious beliefs from state
challenge.26
The parallel to subjectivism in economics can now be made ex-
plicit. Recall that Thomas Hobbes, groping to his now standard
economic theory of private contract in Leviathan,27 stressed that
the value that any individual attached to a thing was solely a func-
tion of the "appetite" and desire he had for it. Apart from desire,
no objective measure of value explained whether an exchange
should be regarded as fair. Within this system, the essential role of
consent was to ensure that both parties were better off in their own
eyes; otherwise, as rational persons, they would not enter into the
trade.
The theory of property rights, with its emphasis upon the sepa-
rate domains of conduct, thus responds to the subjectivity of value.
It says, once we know that there is no collective conception of the
good, we should choose that arrangement of rights that allows each
person the maximum scope to develop his own conception of the
good. What arrangement? Answer: personal liberty and property
rights, as ordinarily understood. In practice, we can achieve only
some incomplete realization of that goal, given the fact of scarcity.
Insistence on separate domains prevents acceptance of individ-
ual conceptions of the good that require killing or subjugating per-
sons with different practices or beliefs. Within this system the use
of state force is sharply rationed. The state may impose some
forced exchanges to raise the taxes, to police the boundaries be-
tween persons, and, as becomes relevant later, to overcome the in-
tractable holdout problems that can exist in certain common pool
settings. But even when coercion is used, its permissible justifica-
tions are only two. The first is to prevent coercion that, if exer-
cised, makes it impossible for others to have or exercise any prefer-
ences at all. The second is to secure social arrangements that
cannot be brought about by consent, but only when the persons
coerced are made better off by the use of government force than
they would have been without it. These rules are designed to pre-
serve and advance individual and subjective conceptions of value.
Not only do the rules minimize the number of collective decisions
26. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
27. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (E.P. Dutton & Co. ed. 1950).
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that have to be made, they also try to make collective decisions in
ways that do not prefer one conception of the good life to another,
with the caveats on the use of external force noted above.
This conception fits in very nicely with the "wall of separation"
between state and religion.28 Again, the correct strategy is to
choose that delineation of rights that minimizes collective determi-
nations of the good, or of truth. By taking this line, the state does
not have to decide the merits of religious beliefs, only their sincer-
ity. Using conceptions of liberty and property again minimizes con-
flicts between state and church, even though there is little consti-
tutional protection against general economic regulation of the
rights of disposition of property.
V. THE ESTABLISHMENT COMPLICATION
Thus far I have shown how the claims of free exercise of religion
depend on adopting the very conceptions of liberty and property
that ironically have been rejected uniformly in connection with ec-
onomic liberties today. If, therefore, the free exercise clause is
given a faithful rendition, the Constitution speaks with a clear and
powerful voice; religious organizations can choose with whom to
deal on all matters of concern to them. Another side of the coin,
however, makes the overall constitutional analysis more complex
than it appears thus far. In addition to the free exercise clause,
there is also the establishment clause, providing that Congress
shall make no law with respect to the establishment of religion.29
Historically, the clause had as its most obvious consequence the
prohibition of an established church, such as the Church of Eng-
land. But as with most general pronouncements, it is very difficult
to find a principled way to confine the clause to the fact situation
that inspired it. Establishment of a state church will usually entitle
it to privileges and benefits that are denied to other religious insti-
tutions. It is, therefore, fair to ask in this context whether the state
could drop the formal title of "established church" and still pro-
vide financial or other benefits to one church and its members, yet
28. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (citation omitted) ("In the words
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall
of separation between Church and State.' ").
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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deny similar benefits to other religious institutions. The prospect
of abuse seems too great for anyone to tolerate happily these trans-
parent evasions. As a result the establishment requirement applies
to "partial establishments" much the way the takings clause ap-
plies to "partial takings." The bottom line is that the state cannot
provide a set of benefits, preferences or privileges for any church
that it does not extend on equal terms, and, perhaps, of equal
value, to other religions. The prohibition of an established church
imports a prohibition against the use of a subsidy or benefit for
some religious organizations that is denied to others. An ines-
capable "equal protection dimension" attaches to the establish-
ment clause, just as it does to forced exchanges under the eminent
domain clause, measured as they are by the familiar test of dispro-
portionate impact.30
Focusing on the takings analogy in the establishment context
also explains why "separation" ought not be regarded as an abso-
lute in church-state relations any more than individual autonomy
ought to be regarded as an absolute in economic affairs. Whenever
there are transaction cost obstacles, some forced exchanges will
work for the benefit of all parties. To take the simplest example, a
rule that denies religious persons access to highways that public
monies have built has scant justification. The correct view is to
subject religious organizations to the same type and level of assess-
ments that are imposed upon nonreligious landowners who benefit
from the same improvement. Again no effort has been made to de-
termine why religious institutions wish to have access to public
highways. There is only the sense that a rule that makes special
assessments proportionate to front footage or market value works
to benefit both religious and nonreligious institutions alike, with-
out having to measure the precise gains obtained by either. A strict
principle of separation might forbid even these joint ventures.
A more sensible view, however, recognizes that an absolute sepa-
rationist position pays too high a price in his effort to prevent the
redistribution by government action to or from religious organiza-
tions. By this logic it is wholly appropriate to provide general
funds for transportation or for educational programs that are avail-
30. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); R. EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at
204-10.
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able on equal terms to religious and nonreligious students alike, as
courts have allowed in some cases,3 but denied in others.32 In prin-
ciple, controlling the dangers of redistribution along religious lines
is possible, for example, by confining the aid to those programs
from which religious and nonreligious students derive equal bene-
fit. Taking the stronger approach, which excludes religious organi-
zations from the benefit of tax programs, will eliminate redistribu-
tion toward religion, but only at the unacceptable cost of
promoting redistribution away from religion. To allow the state to
impose a tax on religious organizations and purposes and then to
spend its proceeds solely for the advancement of secular ends is to
risk danger rising unto folly. And once the extreme case is ac-
knowledged, the intermediate cases follow as a matter of course. If
X percent of any tax falls upon religious organizations and individ-
uals, X percent of the benefits should devolve on the same groups
and individuals so taxed. Only the administrative difficulties of
measuring costs should allow rough approximation to substitute
for perfect alignment. The possibilities of successful joint projects
between church and state require close judicial scrutiny, but they
cannot be simply ignored or dismissed out of hand. Separation of
church and state should create a presumption no stronger than
that of individual autonomy. The insistence that all forced in-
terchanges between state and religion work to mutual benefit car-
ries the best of the eminent domain principles into the area of
church and state relations.
Using the takings parallel also explains, I believe, why the reli-
gion clauses have not been limited to cases of preferences and priv-
ileges among religions, and for good reason. That view, if accepted,
carries with it the implication that to have a world of nonreligious
people subsidize the world of religious people is constitutionally
permissible. This position is inconsistent with the narrow justifica-
tions for government coercion set out above, 3 for when the state
subsidizes religion, coercion is used neither to restrain force nor to
provide benefits otherwise unattainable through voluntary transac-
31. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398 (1983); Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
32. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985) (prohibiting remedial
programs on parochial school premises, owing to a fear of entanglement).
33. See supra pp. 387-88.
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tions by the party taxed. Redistribution presupposes necessarily
that some set of needs, values or persons are better than others. It
thus puts the state in the business of deciding the worth of prefer-
ences and beliefs in ways that are inconsistent with the theory of
subjective value still used in the religious arena.
Forcing the nonreligious to subsidize the religious thus injects
the possibility of one-way transfers across the deep divide of sepa-
rate factions or groups-a recipe for political dynamite. Coping
with these redistributions in the religious context does not present
any special problem for those few of us who think that the takings
or due process clause prevents all systematic forms of redistribu-
tion. There is no need to press the establishment clause into a ser-
vice performed elsewhere in the Constitution. The prohibition
against general redistributive taxes on regulation conveniently
sidesteps the ambiguities of the establishment clause. Indeed, the
takings barrier retains considerable bite even when the welfare
function is regarded as wholly legitimate. In line with the pre-1937
distinctions, it is possible to make transfers from rich to poor, from
young to old, or old to young, on the strength of criteria that have
nothing to do with religion. To be sure, some redistribution along
religious lines may consequently be necessary, but that may have
to be tolerated as an "incidental" effect so long as the motive is not
religious but secular-to help the poor, but not to help religions
with a disproportionate number of poor members. 4 But transfers
between religious groups lie outside any welfare exception, so to-
day's establishment clause prohibition could have been enforced
via the takings clause.
Nonetheless, with the weak prohibitions against all forms of sec-
ular redistribution-farmers can rip off city dwellers, and city
renters can get rent subsidies paid by farmers-the stress on the
establishment clause is made greater by the general New Deal
hands-off attitude to redistribution. A precise parallel exists here
to the greater pressure placed upon the free exercise clause by the
decline in constitutional protection of economic liberties. Today,
no nonreligious barriers buffer the religion clauses from a powerful
34. I explore these tensions in Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: Un-
constitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 4, 79-
104 (1988).
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pounding, so the establishment clause, perhaps against the weight
of the historical evidence, 5 takes the broader role of preventing
redistribution from nonreligious to religious activities. The redis-
tribution of preference, benefit or favor from nonreligious to reli-
gious groups is similarly impossible. Thus, the principle of liberty
derived from the free exercise clause is matched by the principle of
non-redistribution derived intellectually from the takings clause,
which is implemented via the establishment clause.
Within the context of labor relations, however, these two religion
clauses are in powerful tension with each other. The free exercise
argument advanced for the autonomy of religious groups from, say,
the collective bargaining statutes, finds opposition in an establish-
ment clause argument running the other way. Religious institu-
tions are, as the argument for religious liberty concedes, total insti-
tutions that express themselves in a wide range of activities, such
as care for the elderly and education for people of all ages. Now
suppose that we have a rule that requires all nonreligious organiza-
tions in these areas to abide by collective bargaining. As these
groups are in competition with religious organizations, a fatal pref-
erence and imbalance inevitably arises, so the argument goes, if the
legal rules permit religious organizations to escape the heavy costs
of dealing with labor unions. The point is even more pressing when
we note that many religious organizations regard service, including
service provided for a price, as an imperative not only for persons
of their own religious faith, but for all persons in need. The Catho-
lic schools in Chicago educate a large number of Protestants, many
of whom are black. So why doesn't this statutory preference create
a clear, albeit partial, establishment of religion that offends the es-
tablishment clause of the Constitution?
In my view, this question has no satisfactory answer if the estab-
lishment clause is to be taken in isolation from the free exercise
clause. The former mandates a prohibition on redistribution that
arises whenever differential treatment results. The latter mandates
the adoption of a principle of individual liberty that is rejected in
ordinary economic affairs. If we start with liberty as the baseline,
we cannot require religious organizations to surrender their auton-
omy over either their work force or activities that they regard as
35. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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essentially religious. If we start with parity between religious and
nonreligious organizations, we cannot allow the religious organiza-
tions to escape legal constraints thought to be necessary to protect
employees of rival firms. The dilemma seems complete. Jurists
have protested that the Constitution does not require us to walk
the tightrope between the free exercise clause and the establish-
ment clause.36 But I am far from persuaded that the degree of dis-
cretion available here is as great as has been supposed. Again, the
takings parallel is instructive. In the domain of taxation, for exam-
ple, I believe that the level of state discretion is over only the
amount of the taxes to be collected, not the form of their collec-
tion.37 Stated otherwise, the state can meet whatever budget target
for general revenues it desires, but it must do so within the frame-
work of a fiat tax. To use a progressive income tax is to subsidize
the poor at the expense of the rich, and to use a regressive tax is to
subsidize the rich at the expense of the poor. To use either is to
sacrifice overall social gain to the interests of one or the other fac-
tion. In each case one has to look at both the taxes that are raised
and the uses to which the monies are put in order to obtain an
ideal fit between the two. Although redistribution cannot be wholly
prevented whenever expenditures on public goods are made, pow-
erful constitutional limitations on the form of the tax can reduce
its incidence, and hence the social losses that it generates.
Against this backdrop, it is instructive to analyze the attitude
taken toward charitable exemptions for religious purposes. In Walz
v. Tax Commission,38 for example, the Court sustained a statute
that allowed tax exemptions pursuant to a state constitutional pro-
vision authorizing tax exemptions for "religious, educational or
charitable purposes" by "any corporation or association organized
or conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes and not
operating for profit."39 Its rationale was in part as follows: "We
cannot read New York's statute as attempting to establish religion;
it is simply sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of
36. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 912 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
37. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 295-303.
38. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
39. Id. at 666-67.
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property taxation levied on private profit institutions."4 The
Court also stated:
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the gov-
ernment does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but
simply abstains from demanding that the church support the
state. No one has ever suggested that tax exemption has con-
verted libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into arms of the state
or put employees "on the public payroll." There is no genuine
nexus between tax exemption and establishment of religion.41
Stated this generally, the position has to be wrong. The inci-
dence of taxation can never be understood solely in terms of large
aggregate entities like church and state. One must trace the inci-
dence of the taxes down to the individuals who are both burdened
and benefited by the taxes in question. When all persons are taxed
in proportion to their holdings, we can assume that gains are
roughly proportionate to those holdings, given the difficulties of
using a perfectly nondiscriminatory tax on income to achieve parti-
san ends. But once some groups are given an exemption, others
must pay more to receive the same benefits as before. The fact that
the "government does not transfer part of its revenue to
churches" '42 hardly matters. What matters is the possibility that an
implicit transfer from nonreligious to religious people will occur,
creating a subsidy to the extent that the only items exempt from
taxation are religious ones.4"
This conclusion holds, moreover, even if those individuals so
taxed are better off with the tax, notwithstanding the religious or-
ganization, than they would have been. without any tax and, of
course, no religious exemption. Thus, if the world without taxation
gives religious groups and nonreligious groups each a value of 100,
and a world with taxation gives religious groups a value of 120 and
nonreligious groups a value of 110, the skewed distribution of the
gain is best understood as an implicit transfer of five units of bene-
40. Id. at 673.
41. Id. at 675.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., McConnell & Posner, An Economic Approach to the Issues of Religious
Freedom, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 8, 12-13 (1989).
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fit from nonreligious groups to religious groups, and that transfer
is prima facie evidence of the forbidden establishment.
Nonetheless, finding ways to rebut the presumption is often pos-
sible. Thus, the same statutes may provide similar charitable ex-
emptions to other types of organization, as was manifestly the case
in Walz. If these other exemptions did nothing to alter the balance
of holdings between religious and nonreligious groups, then in my
view the establishment clause objection to the religious exemption
from taxation would still stand. But if these other exemptions did
provide roughly offsetting benefits to nonreligious organizations,
then the showing of a countervailing subsidy effectively counters
the establishment clause objection. Although we may be better off
with no exemptions than with many, that point is relevant only to
a more generalized takings type of challenge conducted under a
strict scrutiny standard, an inquiry effectively barred under pre-
sent law. Those forms of redistribution are wholly irrelevant to the
establishment clause issue.
In this view, therefore, religious exemptions not shared by other
groups are necessarily suspect under the establishment clause, as
the Court held recently in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,44 over
Justice Scalia's dissent.45 The converse does not follow, however, in
that broad-based exclusions that include other forms of charitable
exemptions are not necessarily free from establishment clause
challenges. The distributive effect of those other exemptions is
what matters, and such an inquiry places extraordinary demands
on our feeble tools of measurement. The tightrope that must be
walked between the establishment and the free exercise clause
leaves very little room to maneuver and seems to condemn any ex-
44. 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
45.'In my view, Justice Scalia's dissent clearly misinterprets Walz. Although many spe-
cific statutes provide benefits only to religious organizations, the legislature passed them
pursuant to more general programs that gave exemptions, as the New York Constitution
required, for all religious, educational and charitable functions. One must look at the whole
package, not at the individual statutes in isolation. No larger package of legislation, how-
ever, was challenged in Texas Monthly. Note too that McConnell and Posner find Texas
Monthly a difficult case because they are uncertain whether the religious magazines, exempt
from the tax, are in direct competition with other magazines subject to the tax. McConnell
& Posner, supra note 43, at 13. If, however, one focuses on implicit transfers of wealth tied
to the provision of public goods, the case for invalidating the exemption is far stronger.
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emption directed solely toward religious organizations. This ines-
capable tension applies in the labor area as well.
VI. CATHOLIC BISHOP OF CHICAGO
The scope of the tension was manifest in NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago,46 a case in which the question was whether the
NLRB could hold union elections for lay teachers who taught at
several Catholic parochial schools. The NLRB had taken the posi-
tion that it would not intervene in those schools whose mission was
completely religious, but it could intervene under the labor stat-
utes in those schools that, while associated with religious organiza-
tions, nonetheless had a significant secular component to their ac-
tivities. In other words, Catholic seminaries were outside the
Board's jurisdiction, but parochial schools were within it. By a five
to four vote, the Supreme Court engaged in a tour de force of stat-
utory "construction" that allowed it to avoid the thorny constitu-
tional issues lurking around the corner. Although the language of
the National Labor Relations Act contains a comprehensive defini-
tion of who is an employer, complete with eight stated exemptions
from coverage, the Court's majority took the position that the stat-
ute should not be construed to reach religious schools because the
statute showed no explicit textual effort to cover that case.47 The
Court found the constitutional questions so acute and so manifest
that it felt Congress should lay down the gauntlet before the Court
would attack those issues head on.48 Justice Brennan's dissent did
not tackle the constitutional questions head on, but it forcefully
attacked the Court for using dubious stratagems of statutory con-
struction and for refusing to deal with the issues that the case
raised.49
At least this word, however, can be said for prudence: The status
quo ante has proved politically stable even if intellectually unsatis-
fying. There is, therefore, some practical wisdom in avoiding
46. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
47. Id. at 505-06.
48. Id. at 507.
49. Id. at 508-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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trouble when it is not wanted"° and in forcing Congress to lay
down the gauntlet after the constitutional issues have been ex-
pressly brought to its attention. But if the bullet must be bitten,
how should the issue of principle be decided?
In this context, I believe that the standard modes of American
constitutional analysis are not equal to the task. Normally, consti-
tutional analysis requires the individual citizen to demonstrate
first some prima facie violation of a constitutional right, and then
imposes upon the government the burden of justifying its action by
meeting some standard of review. This last task is complicated by
the fact that our 1937 legacy requires very different standards of
review for religious and economic legislation, the latter clearly be-
ing subjected to the low standard of "rational basis" review and
the former to a higher standard of review that, in the religion area
at least, does not, however, seem to quite reach the lofty level of
strict scrutiny.
No matter how the apple is sliced, constitutional analysis re-
quires a good deal of "balancing" the liberty infringed against the
justification offered. Unfortunately, the strength of neither interest
has a powerful consensus. Thus, with respect to liberty, a threshold
question is whether the same level of protection is accorded the
internal affairs of a religious organization as is accorded its deal-
ings with outsiders. Even here, however, further distinctions may
be required if the "outsiders" are co-religionists or individuals who
perform functions that are sensitive to the religious activities.
Clear lines are not easy to draw between the unionization of clergy,
kitchen help with kosher food, lay and religious teachers, and jani-
tors and clerical staff.
Likewise, the power of the state interest is very uncertain. Ini-
tially, enormous disagreements have arisen as to whether labor
statutes are merely tolerated under the rational basis test or posi-
tively welcomed as a form of union democracy that brings Ameri-
can labor law out of the dark ages of the common law into the
gladsome light of modern jurisprudence. The Court, which can stu-
50. The most notorious case in which prudence would have been welcome is Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), a case in which the Court addressed a set of thorny issues
involving the Georgia sodomy statute when it could (and should) have refused to examine
the issue until an actual prosecution under the statute had occurred.
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diously avoid examining the merits of the labor statute when the
statute's constitutionality alone is at stake, cannot hide behind the
rational basis test when the state interests under the labor statutes
compete with the religious liberties of the organizations that they
regulate. Someone has to decide. How?
Even after the strength of the overall labor statutes is assessed, a
question remains as to how strongly the statutes apply to various
classifications of workers who might be unionized. One might think
that teachers are better able to do without a union than are
janitorial staff because the teachers are presumably better edu-
cated and relatively well-to-do. Nonetheless, outside the religious
context, there is scarcely any distinction between the rights of
these various groups of employees under the labor statutes. Be-
yond the prohibition against the organization of management as
such, all workers are treated alike. So again, the competition be-
tween labor statutes and religious liberties forces a court to make
far more exact gradations of the labor statutes than it does in ordi-
nary economic contexts, but without giving the court the tools to
do its job.
When the two interests are placed side by side, the possibilities
are legion. One can rate the religious interest as high, and the labor
regulation interest as low, or the reverse. One could possibly split
the difference and use different standards for various classes of
workers. But these are outcomes driven only by the necessity to
decide; they are not dictated by the logical or normative power of
the decision principle. The inconsistency between the free exercise
clause and the establishment clause, given collective bargaining, is
a logical inconsistency that cannot be evaded or remedied by
"balancing."
The only way to avoid the balancing minuet is to knock out the
labor statutes altogether, which, while I would do it, 1 is only an
idle pipe dream today. The clauses could then be read in harmony
without ad hoc balancing. Religious organizations receive no pref-
erence over their secular rivals, as both can hire and fire at will.
Religious autonomy is preserved for exactly the same reason. The
religious liberty of the free exercise clause and the equal treatment
51. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 280-81.
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of the establishment clause are both preserved. They cannot be
preserved in so neat a fashion, however, under the welfare state.
VII. THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES
Although the Court in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago52
could finesse its problems with the religion clauses through artful
statutory construction, that escape was not available in Corpora-
tion of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos.5 3 That case involved the ten-
sion between the religion clauses and the antidiscrimination norm
embodied in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.54 In princi-
ple, the antidiscrimination norm is as imperial as the collective
bargaining norm; no employment relationship is necessarily ex-
cluded from its application. Congress tried to defuse the tension
between the free exercise clause and Title VII by an express provi-
sion, section 702, that allows religious organizations to discriminate
in favor of their own members with respect to employment for any
"religious corporation, association, educational institution, or soci-
ety.' '55 This statutory maneuver, however, exposed the statute to
an establishment clause challenge, which in this instance was
brought by a building engineer the Mormons had discharged from
working in their school gymnasium because he no longer qualified
for a "temple recommend," that is, participation within the
Church's religious activities.56 If the Church had not been a reli-
gious organization, its decision to fire would have been a per se
violation of Title VII. The exemption, therefore, gave the religious
organization a preference over similar nonreligious organizations
both within and beyond the charitable field. Prior to 1937, the ten-
sion would not have arisen because the Court probably would have
struck down the antidiscrimination statutes, like the prohibition
on "yellow-dog" contracts, as an impermissible interference with
freedom of contract. In the modern environment, however, the
conflict cannot be escaped, at least in principle.
52. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
53. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
54. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to e-17 (1982).
55. Id. §702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
56. Amos, 483 U.S. at 330.
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The Court wriggled out of difficulties in Amos by allowing the
exemption to stand under the weaker rational basis test, reserving
for the moment at least, a stricter scrutiny for distinctions that
exist among religious organizations in accordance with their be-
liefs. 57 Nonetheless, the use of the rational basis standard leaves
unanswered the harder question of whether the free exercise clause
blocks the application of the antidiscrimination laws to religious
organizations if Congress chooses to extend them that far. Indeed,
the problem is in a sense at hand right now because the exemption
provided in section 702 of Title VII does not extend to discrimina-
tion by religious organizations on the ground of race or sex. In
principle, therefore, the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Jews
are apparently in violation of Title VII because of their refusal to
ordain women as priests and rabbis, respectively, unless (as ap-
pears probable) they could bring their case under the bona fide
occupational qualification exception to Title VII,58 which has, of
course, been narrowly construed.5 9 If the Court adheres to a ra-
tional basis approach to this free exercise claim, the result must be
the mirror image of that reached in Amos. The state's judgment
prevails, either way, because the relative strengths of the interests
on both sides of the line make it impossible to articulate any judi-
cial test that places a firm boundary on the extent of state action.
Yet the rational basis test is no more appropriate here than in
any other area of constitutional adjudication. The specific protec-
tion of religious liberty and the specific prohibition of an establish-
ment of religion have to be respected as firm constitutional injunc-
tions, not as mushy presumptions that changing congressional fad
and fancy can easily override. As with" the collective bargaining
statutes, their logical consistency is preserved only in a world with-
out antidiscrimination laws for private businesses. At that point,
57. Id. at 339.
58. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(e)(1).
59. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-34 (1977) (citing the "virtually uni-
form view of the federal courts that § 703(e) provide only the narrowest of exceptions to the
general rule requiring equality of employment opportunities." Id. at 333.) The key question
is the level of scrutiny. The standard "business necessity" tests of Title VII offer little hope
to litigants who want to establish a bona fide occupational qualification exception, but in
this context, it seems likely the exception will be held to apply.
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religious organizations will have perfect liberty and no advantage
over their ordinary secular rivals.
Nonetheless, the prospects for this constitutional revolution are
remote at best, even though recent cases suggest that the received
interpretation of Title VII no longer represents current law. 0
Again, in the face of explicit contradiction, a balancing test offers
the only illusion of escape. Title VII takes the first step along that
road when it distinguishes religious organizations from the ordi-
nary commercial businesses that they control and excludes only
the former from its operation. Doubtless, the commercial regula-
tion will be accepted because as the element of direct competition
between religious and nonreligious organizations increases, the
competing free exercise claim ebbs, given that religious organiza-
tions themselves often have no religious reason to discriminate
against outsiders. As the law moves closer to the religious core,
however, the same tensions that manifested themselves in the col-
lective bargaining statutes surface anew.
Beyond the obvious, however, the analysis becomes murkier. As
with the labor statutes, the takings and due process challenges to
the antidiscrimination laws were hurdled easily under the rational
basis test, so that the Court did not have to commit itself to saying
just how important Title VII was to the structure of American life.
But while the labor statutes have remained in some constitutional
nether world, clearly the antidiscrimination laws have not. The
Court has held in related contexts that a compelling state interest
exists for the elimination of all forms of discrimination from our
national life, and it has thus overrun the claims, for example, of
private clubs to the right to discriminate against women or, for
that matter, men, and it has shown a regrettable willingness to
deny charitable deductions to religious organizations that impose
restrictions on interracial dating as well.6 1 The betting here is that
60. For an example, see the transformation of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
61. See, e.g., New York State Club Assoc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983). The Court's holdings to such effect
concededly predate its rulings in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989),
and Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2115. Yet even these cases affirm the importance of the
antidiscrimination principle even as they limit the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (governing the
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the Court will sustain Title VII in the race, sex and age cases until
a case reaching the Court touches on religious personnel or liturgy.
Nonetheless, I do honor the free exercise claim across the board
for religious institutions on the ground that the common law base-
lines offer the only feasible way to understand the scope of organ-
ized religious activities.2 The level of intrusion into religious af-
fairs is just too massive if Title VII, complete with its disparate
impact test whose status is now unclear after Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio,63 is applied without regard to the ends that it serves.
The Catholic Church, like the Orthodox Jews, has built-in sex clas-
sifications that go to the distribution of power throughout its orga-
nizations. There is today enormous internal unrest and opposition,
and thoughtful critics have condemned the status quo as sexist,
archaic and the product of false consciousness, male patriarchy or
worse. It is one thing, however, for a religious institution to yield
its traditions through internal change in order to keep the consent
and the loyalty of the governed. It is quite another for outsiders to
impose their own external standards of right and wrong on these
bodies. The essence of freedom is the right to decide for oneself
what is right and what is wrong. Freedom rests upon the idea that
there is no collective conception of the good that all persons must
follow. The antidiscrimination norm fares no better on this count
than any other principle that challenges freedom of association.
When religious organizations use force and deception against out-
siders, they interfere with outsiders' rights to conduct their own
affairs. In contrast, when a religious organization practices discrim-
ination in its internal affairs for whatever reason, it only opens the
avenue for rival churches to gain the support of disaffected mem-
bers. The problem is self limiting. The basic concern of religious
liberty is freedom: The opposition to freedom is tyranny, which is
best avoided by keeping the antidiscrimination laws at a safe dis-
tance from religious organizations.
The establishment clause claim on the other side is far weaker.
It goes to the matter of competitive imbalance. But how much
right to make and enforce contracts) and disparate impact cases respectively (holding that
statistical evidence did not establish a prima facie case of disparate impact).
62. For a more general parallel argument, see Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of
Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 966-77 (1989).
63. 109 S. Ct. at 2115.
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weight should we attach to that issue when the world regards com-
petitive equilibria as generally irrelevant in economic affairs? The
great assumption of the post-New Deal cases is that competitive
principles do not work in labor markets, or so Congress could de-
cide. For that reason, we have created complex cartel structures of
labor unions, the minimum wage and other work restrictions in
(the irony is in the title) the Fair Labor Standards Act. Because of
this regulation, we have Title VII. The use of these statutes creates
incredible imbalances and distortions with their attendant welfare
losses in ordinary markets. The redeployment of resources toward
capital, the relocation of plants and the shifting of labor to off-
shore markets are all predictable and necessary economic conse-
quences of the current regulatory order. But we ignore them in the
belief that centralized control of these matters does not offend the
Constitution. This background makes it odd to resurrect as a con-
stitutional touchstone the condition of competitive balance be-
tween religious and nonreligious employers. It seems far safer to
avoid the endless entanglements and inevitable ad hoc judgments
by adopting a simple, but uneasy rule that applies Title VII, for
race, sex and age, as well as religion, with full vigor against the
commercial businesses owned and controlled by religious organiza-
tions. By the same token, application of Title VII should be wholly
removed from the core religious side of the organization. No per-
fect fit between the competing interests is possible, of course, but
there is at least a known and stable accommodation, one consistent
with the definition and mission that religious organizations hold
for themselves. In the days of big government, clear limits are
more important than perfect justice.
VIII. PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS WORKERS
Given both collective bargaining and Title VII, the question
posed for the religion clauses is how far the government can go to
deny religious organizations the ordinary protections of contractual
freedom. One should not suppose, however, that every exercise of
government power works to strip religious organizations and per-
sons of their ordinary common law rights of contract and property.
In some cases, statutes seek to give religious workers advantages
that ordinary individuals do not hold. Consistent with our basic
analysis, the courts should strike down these statutes on establish-
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ment clause grounds. As with other liberties, the free exercise of
religion is subject to the normal constraint against the use of force
on outsiders.
One recent case that illustrates these issues is Estate of Thorn-
ton v. Caldor, Inc.14 In this case the issue involved the constitu-
tionality of a statute that allowed workers to both keep their jobs
and not work on their chosen Sabbath, regardless of the employer's
preferences. The statute was passed after the Connecticut Sunday
closing laws, themselves of dubious constitutionality," had been
repealed. The motivation behind the statute was inseparable from
the prior state of affairs. When the Sunday closing laws were in
effect, no employer could tell an employee he had to work against
his will on Sunday. Employees would have lost this protection with
the repeal of the Sunday closing laws save for the new Connecticut
statute that restored the status quo ante on this narrow point. In
conformity with sound establishment clause thinking, the state
also extended the same benefit to individuals with different
Sabbaths.
At first blush, the statute seems to support the free exercise of
religion, at least if the only question is whether religious obser-
vance is advanced because of the statute's protection. Nonetheless,
the Court, by an eight to one vote, struck down the statute on the
grounds that it violated the establishment clause because it ad-
vanced religious organizations over other organizations." I believe
that this decision was sound, given the account of religious liberty
delineated above. In Thornton, the religious individual wanted to
have an exemption from the ordinary principles of freedom of con-
tract that, in the world before 1937, governed economic affairs at a
constitutional level. In that context, what is sought is an explicit
subsidy for religion to be funded by individuals who have no par-
ticular religious beliefs. The inescapable effect of the rules is to
place religious individuals at a systematic competitive advantage
over their nonreligious rivals.
64. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
65. The Court sustained the constitutionality of the laws in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961).
66. Thornton, 472 U.S. at 710-11.
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If, however, the conception of religious liberty is derived from
the earlier conception of economic liberty, then the state in Thorn-
ton has gone beyond its powers. There is no risk of force or fraud
to be controlled. Thornton is not a case like Sherbert v. Verner,67
in which the question was whether the state may deny religious
persons, unwilling to work on the Sabbath, the right to receive
state unemployment benefits. In Sherbert, the state may have
forced the worker to choose between her religious beliefs and un-
employment benefits, but in Thornton the state has not forced the
individual to choose at all between his religion and his occupation.
Instead, the employer has "forced" that choice upon the worker, in
the ordinary exercise of his private right to contract. The question
remains a matter of straight private evaluation, leaving the worker
to decide whether his religious needs tug stronger at his heart-
strings than his economic needs tug at his pocketbook. In practice,
one expects that workers and employers will reach some form of
accommodation on issues of this sort; good employees are hard to
find. But one cannot speak about the issue categorically, indepen-
dent of the facts in particular cases. If the employer runs an outlet
store that does most of its business on Sundays, as was the case in
Thornton, the absence of its manager on a busy shopping day may
be critical to its operations. We should expect this accommodation
to fail and the worker to look elsewhere for a job that gives Sun-
days off. In my judgment, a very dangerous precedent is set by
saying that the power of the religious claim is so strong that it
trumps the employer's economic claim whenever it is placed in op-
position to it.
My colleague, Michael McConnell, has suggested that Thornton
was wrongly decided because the only cost imposed upon the em-
ployer was economic-a cost against which the employer could
protect itself in the legislature if the cost got too high. 8 After all,
he argues, to uphold the employer's economic interest in this con-
text is odd when the Court uniformly upholds so many regulations
more onerous on employers.
Although I follow Professor McConnell on most points, I must
part company with him here. The number of dollars, or the burden
67. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
68. See McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 57-58.
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of the legislation, has little to do with the principle involved, which
is the elimination of both religious penalty and religious subsidy.
Behind those two injunctions lies the fundamental proposition that
values are subjective and manifested in trade. In my view, there is
no violation of the free exercise clause if the employer is allowed
not to hire a worker for any reason, including his religious prac-
tices. What the worker wants in this context is a subsidy; what the
free exercise clause protects is freedom. Just as no viable free exer-
cise claim forces someone to hire you against his will, nothing
counterbalances the establishment clause argument that the state
has subsidized religious practices. This conclusion would be, I take
it, well nigh inescapable if the state offered to pay a small sum out
of public funds to the employer to defray the additional costs it
had to bear to keep the religious worker on its payroll. The man-
dated benefit under the Connecticut statute has the unhappy eco-
nomic feature of imposing a hidden and selective tax on certain
employers when the state does not pay the tab itself. But this sec-
ond vice of the Connecticut statute hardly cancels out the first. If a
public subsidy of religious workers is not acceptable under the es-
tablishment clause, then a public mandate of a private subsidy is
unacceptable as well.
This entire problem, moreover, would not have arisen if freedom
of contract had remained a powerful constitutional principle in ec-
onomic affairs. But once freedom is displaced in economic rela-
tions, interference with business contracts can be limited only on
religious grounds. Unlike the collective bargaining cases and the
antidiscrimination cases, Thornton is one situation in which we do
not have to wander through an endless forest balancing interests.
Striking down the statute offends no claim for religious freedom,
and it avoids any possible conflict with the establishment clause.
Thornton's personal problem arose because he was caught in the
transition between the older regime of the Sunday closing laws and
the new regime of open markets. Once the new regime is on the
books, however, the marketplace can best allow matters, and jobs,
to sort themselves out without requiring the hand of state inter-
vention to preserve some small vestige of an untenable status quo
ante.
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IX. CONCLUSION
I want to close here with a general set of observations drawn
from these cases. We have examined a system in which all tensions
have arisen because of the rejection of property and contract ideas
in employment markets generally. If we are really prepared to
think about system-wide issues as a matter of first principle, then
we should begin with a reevaluation of the modern view that af-
fords little constitutional protection to economic liberties. By re-
pealing the collective bargaining and antidiscrimination statutes
generally, we can escape most of the conceptual conflicts that arise.
At that point, we can return to the common law baseline and easily
insist that religious organizations honor their contracts just as they
respect the laws of trespass and murder. These common law rules
are good for all seasons, and for all comers. Their regulatory sub-
stitutes are not. The fatal vice of such substitutes is that they
abandon the strategy of defining separate zones of authority in
which all persons can move at will, and substitute in their place
complex regimes of joint ownership and collective control in which
all has to be done "for cause" by balancing government and indi-
vidual interests. We can all do well without such uncertainty.
Concededly, we live in an imperfect world, and we must ask,
therefore, how we can preserve religious liberty and prevent the
establishment of religion when the government is given plenary
power to tax and regulate for all sorts of redistributive ends. In
practice, devising a set of rules that permits redistribution along
economic or class lines, but prohibits it along religious ones, is very
difficult. Indeed, if matters had to be resolved at a constitutional
level only, my best guess is that it would be only a matter of time
before a mass of dubious legal stratagems slowly frittered away the
interests in religious liberties. United States v. Lee, 9 Grand
Rapids v. Bal70 and Bob Jones University v. United States1 are
all clear straws in that direction. But one critical difference be-
tween religion and property remains. Religious claims still exert a
strong hold on Congress, which has often refused to act in ways
that compromise religious liberty even when it has the apparent
69. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
70. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
71. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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power to so behave; this much we have learned from Catholic
Bishop. Religious liberties in the welfare state have a better posi-
tion than might have been the case if the only protections available
were judicial ones. But as matters stand, the success of religious
liberty in this country rests as much on political accommodation as
it does on constitutional theory. Let us hope that our modest por-
tion of good fortune can be preserved.
